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Abstract
This paper proposes an explanation for the universal human desire for
increasing consumption and the associated propensity to trade survival
opportunity oﬀ conspicuous consumption. I argue that this desire was
moulded in evolutionary times by a mechanism known to biologists as
sexual selection, whereby an observable trait — conspicuous consumption
in this case — is used by members of one sex to signal their unobservable
characteristics valuable to members of the opposite sex. It then shows
that the standard economics problem of utility maximisation is formally
equivalent to the standard biology problem of the maximisation of indi-
vidual fitness, the ability to pass genes to future generations, and thus
establishes a rigorous theoretical foundation for including conspicuous
consumption in the utility function.
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Henry saw his car, a hundred yards away, parked at an angle on the rise of the track, picked
out in soft light against a backdrop of birch, flowering heather and thunderous black sky,
and felt for the first time a gentle, swooning joy of possession. It is, of course, possible,
permissible to love an inanimate object... (Ian McEwan, Saturday).
1 Introduction
Homo Economicus’s utility function constitutes one of the fundamental build-
ing block of economics. Its canonical form hinges on two assumptions: that
there are trade-oﬀs among the available commodities and that its shape is in-
dependent of the budget constraint. The latter implies that choices result from
the interaction between income/wealth/resources, which are variable, and pref-
erences, which are fixed. The trade-oﬀs between goods implies that individuals
are willing to sacrifice survival enhancing activities, such as the acquisition of
nutritious food, of adequate shelter, of health care, to acquire goods with zero
or negative survival value like luxury goods, leisure travel, entertainment, and
so on. More succinctly, conspicuous consumption for its own sake enhances
utility. This standard economics assumption clearly tallies with evidence, but
the lack of a theoretical justification for it perplexes other scientists: “West-
ern economics usually assumes that individuals are out to maximise personal
gains, but where is the scientific justification for this assumption? And what
exactly is ‘personal gain’?” (Trivers 1985, p 1). Trivers’ doubts are spelled
out more explicitly by Grafen (1998, p 441): “The formulation of the dynastic
utility function in terms of consumption purely for its own sake is inconsistent
with the biological viewpoint”. The inconsistency is the apparent lack of any
fitness advantage, which any physical or behavioural trait must aﬀord in order
to develop and persist in a population.1
In this paper I propose a foundation for the human propensity to trade
survival opportunities oﬀ conspicuous consumption for its own sake rigorously
based on evolutionary arguments, and therefore consistent with the biological
viewpoint. The universality of the desire for conspicuous consumption across
cultures and continents and the view of evolutionary psychology regarding
the speed of adaptations (Barrett et al. 2002 p 12) indicate that this trait
1Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), and Hopkins and Kornienko
(2004), among others, have posited that conspicuous consumption of goods such as luxury
goods, which are “completely novel in evolutionary terms”, enhances status and that desiring
status is evolutionary “hard-wired” to aﬀect directly an individual’s utility (Robson 2001a p
24). This however, still leaves open the question as to why a higher status is desirable, and
why individuals would trade survival opportunities oﬀ enhanced status.
1
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was hard wired in the brain of early humans prior to their dispersion from
Africa, and therefore must have provided evolutionary advantages in the con-
ditions prevailing between one million and 80,000 years ago. I build on the
established economics tradition which explains features of human behaviour
through evolutionary lenses by looking for fitness advantages of these features.
Alchian (1950, pp 213—214) and Friedman (1953) viewed profit maximisation
as a selection mechanism for firms. More recently, evolutionary advantages
have been suggested for many human traits.2 My viewpoint, however, diﬀers
from most of the literature in that the fitness advantage of the trait consid-
ered is not the enhanced survival chances of the individuals with the trait:
indeed individuals with a stronger desire for conspicuous consumption for its
own sake had a survival disadvantage, relative to individuals with a weaker
desire. They, however, also had a reproductive advantage, which more than
oﬀset their survival disadvantage. Thus the trait became established in the
human genotype, as the genes linked to the trait became more frequent as
generations went by. In the jargon, conspicuous consumption is a signal that
causes sexual selection by mate choice. This is an evolutionary mechanism by
which individuals of one sex signal their unobservable quality to the opposite
sex, and their reproductive success depends on the signal via the mating choice
of the individuals of the opposite sex. This mechanism is the driving force for
the development of traits which are diﬀerentiated by sex and have negative
survival value:3 from the extravagant plumage of pheasants, paradise birds,
2Examples include altruism (Becker 1976, Frank 1987, Bergstrom 1995, Bester and Guth
1998, Eswaran and Kotwal 2004), risk-taking (Robson 1995, Dekel and Scotchmer 1999,
Warneryd 2002), experimentation (Robson 2001b), fertility and labour supply (Grafen 1998),
preferences in general (Dekel et al. 2007, and the references cited therein), and more specif-
ically, preference for relative consumption (Samuelson 2004), individualistic (Ok and Vega-
Redondo 2001) and interdependent preferences (Koçkesen et al. 2000a and 2000b), the rate
of intertemporal preferences (Hansson and Stuart 1990, Rogers 1994, Trostel and Taylor
2001), the dependence of utility on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives (Samuelson
and Swinkles 2006); intergenerational cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier 2001) and
resource flows (Robson and Kaplan 2003), the demand for grandchildren (Cox and Stark
2005), sibling rivalry (Cox and Fafchamps 2008), and more generally, the structure and de-
velopment of the family (Bergstrom 1996, Cox 2007), the emergence of trade (Ofek 2001,
Seabright 2004, Horan et al 2005), economic growth (Galor and Moav 2002).
3“It is to the female’s advantage to be able to pick the most fit male available for fathering
her brood. Unusually fit fathers tend to have unusually fit oﬀspring. One of the functions of
courtship would be the advertisement, by a male, of how fit he is. A male whose general health
and nutrition enables him to indulge in full development of secondary [not physiologically
necessary for reproduction] sexual characters [...] is likely to be reasonably fit genetically [...]
2
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peacocks and many other birds, to the ritual dancing and hopping displays
in “leks”, to the courtship vocalisations in tigers, deer, crickets, frogs, to the
flashing of fireflies, to the complex bowers built and decorated by bowerbirds;
to human traits such as the male beard and the female breasts.4
Zahavi (1975) realised that males’ signals must be costly, exactly in the
sense in which signals are costly in the economics literature (Spence 1973):
the higher an individual’s quality, the less burdensome it is for him to incur
the cost of the signal, and the stronger the signal he will issue to distinguish
himself from his lesser rivals in the eye of the females. His explanation of
sexual selection was given a solid game theoretic foundation by Grafen (1990a
and 1990b).
Consumption for its own sake, conspicuous consumption, I argue here, is
precisely such a signal. It is easy to observe and expensive to acquire. It has
served, throughout history, as an indicator of an individual’s desirability as
a mate. Veblen (1899) identified clearly the importance of expensiveness and
wastefulness of conspicuous consumption: inexpensive items are not, cannot be
eﬀective signals, precisely because their very inexpensiveness makes it possible
for everyone to sport them.5 Unlike Veblen, recent economic analysis has had
In submitting only to a male with such signs of fitness a female would probably be aiding
the survival of her own genes” (Williams 1966, p 184).
4See Zahavi and Zahavi (1997) for many more examples, or Andersson (1994, p 10 and
Table 6.A, pp 132—142), for a taxonomy of the various mechanisms. Darwin devoted much of
the Descent of Man (1871) to it, but, unlike natural selection, sexual selection was rejected for
a long time by the scientific community (Anderson 1994, pp 17—19), a consequence, perhaps,
of Victorian mental strictures and of Darwin’s inability to oﬀer a persuasive explanation of
the mechanism through which it might operate (Darwin 1871). Fisher (1930) reprised Dar-
win’s idea, suggesting that sexual selection works through a mechanism called the “runaway
process” or the “sexy son hypothesis”. This is in the spirit of the herd theory: if all females
prefer certain males, then it pays a female with no preference also to choose those males as
mates, because her sons will need to attract the current females’ daughters, who will inherit
their mother’s preferences, and will be more likely to do so if they inherit their father’s genes.
This idea is not fully satisfactory either: in the absence of a cost of acquiring the trait, all
males will tend to possess the optimum level as generations go by: the observation of varia-
tion across individuals would need to be justified by evolution not having yet completed its
course.
5His books are rich in examples. “The chief use of servants is the evidence they aﬀord
to the master’s ability to pay”, rather than helping him in any useful manner (Veblen 1899,
p 62). Their cumbersome liveries and unwieldy uniforms are actually designed to prevent
them from performing any useful or productive activity. Similarly, skirts persist tenaciously
as fashion accessories because, not despite, they “hamper the wearer at every turn and
incapacitate her for all useful exertion”, thus unmistakably demonstrating that she does not
3
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access to Fisher’s and Zahavi’s insights, and yet has neglected the role of sexual
selection as a powerful engine of human evolution.6
The signalling model in section 2, closely inspired by Grafen (1990a and
1990b), captures these ideas. It describes a population composed of males and
females where the males’ reproductive potential is limited by female choice.
Males diﬀer in their value to females, and face a trade-oﬀ between wasteful
“conspicuous” consumption and unobservable activities which enhance their
chance of survival. Females observe males’ conspicuous consumption and
choose with whom to mate. In a separating equilibrium, males undertake con-
spicuous consumption in order to signal their quality to females, and females
are more likely to mate with males whose observed consumption is higher.
Proposition 2 in Section 3 identifies some conditions on the population and
the environment which ensure that a separating equilibrium exists.
The core of the paper is Section 4. Here I show the natural connection
between maximisation of fitness and maximisation of a utility function with
consumption bundles as arguments. The trade-oﬀ between survival and repro-
duction is mapped one-to-one with the trade-oﬀ between “survival activities”
and “conspicuous consumption”. This provides an evolutionary foundation
to the indiﬀerence maps that constitute the basis of the economic analysis of
consumer behaviour, suggesting that preferences are not arbitrary, but have
evolved in response to our ancestors’ exogenous constraints.
Section 5 discusses some empirical evidence and considers some open eco-
nomics questions in the light of the ideas of the paper, and the Appendix
presents the formal proof of Proposition 2.
2 The Model
2.1 The population
need to work (p 171). Corsets and top hats are among his other examples. By the same
token, in many animal species, powerful males obtain and protect large territories, much
larger than it can be possibly be necessary to provide food and shelter to the family and
subordinate individuals (O’Donald 1963, Zahavi and Zahavi 1997, pp 28—29). This is of
course an all too accurate description of the behaviour of human ruling classes nowadays and
over the entire course of history.
6For example, in his seminal economic analysis of human evolution, Frank notes how
sexual selection traps a species into a prisoner’s dilemma (“peacocks taken as a group would
clearly do better if all had smaller tail feathers” Frank 1988 p 23), but otherwise does not
link it to human evolution, as other social scientists have done (Diamond 1991 pp 175—180,
Miller 2000, Ridley 2003, Buss 2004).
4
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The model is close to Grafen’s seminal paper (1990a). I consider a sexually
reproducing population, comprising two sexes, males and females. Their “mat-
ing season” is divided into T > 1 discrete periods, with matching occuring in
the “mating market” during each period. The interpretation of seasons and
periods within a season is flexible: the season could be the summer and the
periods days; alternatively, the season could be a generation, and each pe-
riod an oestrus cycle. To ease the presentation, I consider the case T = 2;
this can naturally be extended to the more complex case of a generic finite T
(De Fraja 2006). Oﬀspring are born and reared after the end of the mating
season. Within the season, the population dynamics from period to period is
governed by survival and mating. In each period, matching is one-to-one: each
individual is matched to at most one individual of the other sex. Matching
probabilities in period t depend on the population numbers of the two sexes,
given by Ft for females andMt for males. Specifically, a female is matched to a
male with probability qF (Ft,Mt), and a male is matched to a female with prob-
ability qM (Ft,Mt), t = 1, 2. A matched pair will mate if the benefit exceeds
the cost for both parties. In humans, just as in virtually all sexual species, the
opportunity cost of mating diﬀers in the two sexes, and consequently so does
parental investment. I capture this asymmetry with the extreme assumption
of no paternal investment, but the analysis can be extended to less extreme
asymmetry (see below, Section 5.4). Incurring no opportunity cost in mating,
a male agrees to mate whenever he is matched with a female, and returns to
the mating market in the following period. Therefore males are polygynous,
and they may try to choose strategies which allow them to have more than
one mate in the season. Polygyny here follows naturally from the assumed
extreme lack of paternal investment in oﬀspring, which makes maximising the
number of mates the dominant strategy for males. This for simplification and
can be replaced with the alternative assumption, as in Robson (1996), that
a male share his resources among all his oﬀspring. If a male is believed to
have suﬃcient resources, a female would be willing to share him with another
female, in preference to being the sole mate of a male with little resources.
Polygyny in this case would be simultaneous, rather than sequential as in my
model.7
Females diﬀer from males in that, to reproduce successfully, maternal in-
7Another diﬀerence is that, in Robson’s set up, resources are observed: for a signalling
equilibrium to emerge, they would have to be inferred by females from the signal issued by
males.
5
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vestment is necessary, in the form of pregnancy, lactation and other childcare
activities; I assume that a female can have at most one reproductive cycle per
season, and that she leaves the market if she mates. In Dixit and Pyndick’s
terminology (1994), mating in a period (except the last) kills the option of
mating with a higher quality male later in the season. In addition, both males
and females may die during the season.
Females diﬀer in their potential for surviving and maintaining fertility dur-
ing the season. I denote by δ a fertile female’s probability of being alive and
fertile in the next period. In period t, δ is distributed in [0, 1], according to
density φFt (δ) and distribution Φ
F
t (δ), with φ
F
t (δ) =
dΦFt (δ)
dδ . Ft is the total
number of females in period t, t = 1, 2.
Males diﬀer in a quality, measured by a single dimensional parameter, θ,
which, at the beginning of period t in the season, is distributed in [θmin, θmax] ⊆
R, according to the density φMt (θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (θmin, θmax), and distribution
ΦMt (θ), with φ
M
t (θ) =
dΦMt (θ)
dθ .
ΦF1 (θ) and Φ
M
1 (θ) are exogenously given, whereas Φ
F
2 (θ) and Φ
M
2 (θ)
depend on the matching process. ΦMt (θ) is such that the distribution of
types below any θ¯ in (θmin, θmax) has a monotonic hazard rate: for every
θ¯ ∈ (θmin, θmax):
d
dθ
Ã
ΦM1
¡
θ¯
¢
− ΦM1 (θ)
φM1 (θ)
!
< 0, for θ ∈
¡
θmin, θ¯
¢
.
The total number of males in period t, t = 1, ..., T , is denoted by Mt.
The benefit of mating is measured by a function v (θ), satisfying v0 (θ) > 0,
a normalisation, and v (θmin) > 0, mating is always better than not mating:
clearly, if this were violated for some θ then these types would not mate under
any circumstance, and can be removed from the mating process. There is no
gain in generality in having diﬀerential benefits for males and females. v (θ)
can be thought of as the expected number of oﬀspring who survive to adult-
hood and enter the market at the beginning of the next season, even though
other interpretations are possible. Following Grafen (1990a), the distribution
of types is the same at the beginning of each season, both for females and
for males. Suﬃcient, but not necessary, to ensure this is the absence of to-
day’s adults from the future mating seasons, and lack of correlation between
the fathers’ and the sons’ θ’s: an individual’s type is drawn at the beginning
of the season from a distribution invariant to the father’s type, determined,
for example, by the environment. In Grafen (1990a), this assumption is in-
troduced to obtain an equilibrium based on the handicap principle, operating
6
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independently of the Fisher runaway process, mentioned in footnote 4: if the
probability density function of the oﬀspring types is independent of the par-
ents’ types, then, by construction, the Fisher eﬀect cannot operate. This of
course does not imply absence of natural selection: what is passed on to the
next generation is not the genes that determine θ, but rather the genes that
determine the link between θ and the strategy followed by individuals, namely
the function c1 (θ) studied in the paper.
2.2 Males’ strategies.
Males choose8 two variables, conspicuous consumption c ∈ R+, and investment
in survival activities, measured by a variable w ∈ R+, for example the quality of
the diet or the search and adaptation of safe hiding places for the nights: in each
period, a male survives with probability π (w) ∈ (0, 1), with π0 (w) > 0 and
π00 (w) 6 0. Conspicuous consumption is wasteful:9 it has no direct benefit,
but has a cost, described by a standard production possibility frontier:
f (c, w, θ) = 0. (1)
The values of c and w chosen by a type θ male satisfy (1). In (1), fc (·) , fw (·) >
0, to capture the trade-oﬀ between c and w, and fθ (·) < 0, to indicate that
higher quality is associated with an expanded production possibility frontier.
Females can observe the current value of c only, so they cannot determine
directly a male’s quality θ, nor infer it from the observation of w. The role
of c is therefore to serve as a signal. Formally, males’ strategy set is the set
of all measurable mappings from the space of types [θmin, θmax] to the space
of possible signals, in each period (we restrict attention to pure strategies).
Males’ strategies are denoted by {c1 (θ) , c2 (θ)}. In a separating equilibrium
8The term “choose” is typically used in signalling models in economics, but it is also
appropriate in the current more biological set-up, where it does not have the implication of
conscious decision making which human choice has. Thus the peacock is said to choose the
length of his tail, the deer the size of his antlers, the fish the intensity of his coloration, even
though these choices are best described as determined by the interaction of the genotype (the
DNA instructions) with the environment.
9This is therefore unlike Samuelson’s (2004) model where high consumption decreases the
probability of survival when the environment is bad, but increases it when it is good. Instead,
it is analogous to Robson’s (1996) analysis of risk taking, which also consider polygyny: a
risk-averse male may accept slightly unfair bets, which waste resources in expectation, if by
doing so he can accumulate wealth and so increase his chance that a second female accepts
him as mate even though there are available males with no mates. In Robson’s model, unlike
here, wealth is a resource, and so accumulating it is not a wasteful signal.
7
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(which is called a “signalling equilibrium” in the theoretical biology literature),
females infer correctly the males’ types from their observed signal, c, and
choose the best action given their beliefs, and males choose the best signal,
given the females’ actions. Unlike females, males always agree to mate if they
are matched to a female.
From (1) it is convenient to define the function ω : R+×[θmin, θmax] −→ R+,
which associates to a signal c and a type θ the (maximum) level of w that
individual of type θ can acquire who emits signal c: ω (c, θ) is the solution in
w of (1).
It is crucial, for the logic of the handicap principle, that the variable w
cannot be observed by the females. In practice, of course, some resources
can be observed, and indeed display of observable survival resources occurs in
humans and other species (Yosef 1991). To capture this idea by including c as
an argument of the survival function, writing π (w, c) with πc (w, c) > 0, would
complicate the notation a bit and not alter the substa tial analysis, as long as
reducing the unobservable resources, w, to increase what is observable, c, also
reduces the overall chances of survival: formally, πc (w, c) can be positive as
long as it is less than πw (w, c)
fc(c,w,θ)
fw(c,w,θ)
. The fundamental feature of the model
is the presence of some unobservable aspect of males’ behaviour, measured
here by w. Thus the food reserves stored as body fat (which had a positive
eﬀect on survival for all but our most recent existence) can be observed by a
female, but the time spent in selecting nutritious food or checking whether a
food or drink source is safe or contaminated cannot. Recent theories about the
evolution of early hominids hold that “carbohydrate-rich roots [...] provid[ed]
reserve food supplies during hard times [...] and could indeed have been the
fallback food that carried our ancestors from dwindling forest into the more
open woodland and savanna” (Wrangham and Peterson 1996, p 54). In this
vein, a plausible natural interpretation of w is the time a male spends looking
for areas rich in these roots; being a fallback food, they will be needed during
lean times, when competition for food is harshest: for this activity to have
survival value, these areas must be kept hidden from all other individuals,
males and females, and therefore must remain unobserved.
2.3 Females’ optimal strategy.
In each period, a female matched to a male has a very simple action set: either
she mates or she does not mate. In the second period, the last, she mates
8
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with any male she is matched with, since there is no value in postponing, and
therefore her strategy reduces to the binary choice in period 1. Her choice
depends on her survival probability δ and on her belief about the type of the
male she is matched with. Beliefs in period t can be described by the function
cbt (θ), the signal expected from a male of type θ.
10 Formally, let V Ft (δ) be the
expected payoﬀ of a female for being in the mating market at the beginning
of period t.
Definition 1 For given beliefs cb1 (θ), define the acceptance function, α (δ),
as the higher of θmin and of the solution in θ to:
v (θ) = δV F2 , (2)
where:
V F2 = qF (F2,M2)
Z θmax
α2(δ)
v (θ)φM2 (θ) dθ (3)
Notice that since v (θ) is increasing, and V F2 is indipendent of θ, there is
a unique solution to (2). To see how (3) is derived, note that, in the second
period, a female is not matched to a male with probability [1− qF (Ft,Mt)],
in which case her payoﬀ is 0, and is matched with probability qF (F2,M2) and
with probability φM2 (θ) this male is of type θ. If θ > α (δ), she mates with him,
and has payoﬀ v (θ), otherwise she postpones, which happens with probability
ΦM2 (α (δ)), and obtains, in the next period, payoﬀ δV
F
2 . Putting all of this
together (3) is obtained. The acceptance function summarises the strategy
followed by females, and can be drawn in Figure 1 using Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 There exists δ > 0, such that α (δ) = θmin; there exists θ¯ ∈ [0, 1],
such that θ¯ = v−1
¡
V F2
¢
; the function α (δ) is strictly increasing in [δ, 1].
Proof The first two statements are immediate; for the last, total diﬀerentiation of
(2) yields
dα (δ)
dδ
=
V F2 (δ) + δV
F 0
2 (δ)
v0 (θ)
> 0
10Given a prior regarding males’ types φMt (θ), and letting c
b
t (θ) be the strategy fe-
males believe males will follow in period t, the posterior density function inferred from
observing a value c is such that θk has zero density if θk /∈ cbt
−1
(c), and it is given by
φMt (θk)PH
h=1
φMt (θh)
, if cbt
−1
(c) has measure 0 and the image set of cbt
−1
(c) is
©
θ1, ..., θh, ..., θH
ª
,
and by
φMt (θk)R
θ∈ cbt
−1
(c)
φMt (θ)dθ
if instead cbt
−1
(c) has positive measure.
9
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minθ
maxθ
δ
( )δα1
do not mate
mate
0
( )FVv 21−=θ
Figure 1: Female choice in period 1.
whenever α (δ) > θmin, thus proving the last assertion in the Lemma. It also shows
that there can be at most one value δ ∈ [0, 1] such that (2) holds, and v (θmin) > 0
implies the first assertion. Since v is the same in each period, the maximum future
payoﬀ cannot exceed v (θmax), implying the second assertion and establishing the
Lemma.
Because v (θ) is strictly increasing, a female of type δ, matched with a male
of type θ, mates with him if θ > α (δ), and does not mate if θ < α (δ). In words,
a female agrees to mate with a male believed to be of type θ, if her payoﬀ for
mating, v (θ), is at least as big as the payoﬀ for not mating.11 Lemma 1 can
be used to represent females’ strategy in the (δ, θ)-cartesian plane: all females
of type δ < δ mate in the current period with any male type θ, and all females
matched with a suﬃciently “good” male mate with him (note that, in general,
θ¯ is strictly below θmax). This is summarised in Figure 1: female-male matches
such that the combination of types (δ, θ) is in the light grey area mate, those
in the dark area do not.12
11 If θ = α (δ) she is indiﬀerent. This is a measure 0 case, and, for definiteness, I assume
that she mates with probability 1 in this case.
12The model diﬀers from Grafen’s (1990a) where females are all identical, and where males’
strategies are independent of the time in the mating season. Grafen’s model is therefore more
directly applicable to traits which cannot be changed readily, such as the plumage or the depth
of a frog’s call, mine to activities such as dancing, fighting, singing, bower building, and so
on, and of course conspicuous consumption. Certain traits fall in between: a stag’s antlers
respond slowly to external conditions. His model and mine share the fundamental asymmetry
between forward looking females —whose maximisation strategy involves the exercises of an
option, and therefore the forecast of future conditions—, and here-and-now males —for whom
the opportunity cost of mating in the present period is lower.
10
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2.4 Population dynamics.
Some individuals are absent from the matching market in the second period:
males because of death, and females because of both death and successful
mating. These withdrawals depend of course on the strategies followed in
period 1. They determine the following dynamics of the distributions of types.
φF2 (δ) =
F1
F2
δφF1 (δ)
£
1− qF (F1,M1)
£
1− ΦM1 (α (δ))
¤¤
, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] , (4)
F2 = F1
Z 1
0
δφF (δ)
£
1− qF (F1,M1)
£
1− ΦM (α (δ))
¤¤
dδ, (5)
φM2 (θ) =
M1
M2
π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φ
M
1 (θ) , ∀θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] , (6)
M2 =M1
Z θmax
θmin
π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φM1 (θ) dθ. (7)
(4) is the distribution of females in period 2. To see how it is derived, consider
females of type δ. At the beginning of the season, there are F1φF1 (δ) of them.
Of these, a fraction δ [1− qF (F1,M1)] are not matched and survive to the
second period. Of the F1φF1 (δ) qF (F1,M1) who are matched
£
1− ΦM1 (α (δ))
¤
mate and leave the market; of the rest, δ survive and (1− δ) die. This applies
to every δ, which gives (4). The number of females in the market in the second
period, F2, is given in (5) by integration of (4). Similarly, but more simply,
for males: they leave the market only when they die, which happens with
probability 1 − π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ)). Starting with M1φM1 (θ) males of type θ, (6)
and (7) are obtained.
I do not study the dynamics of the population from season to season, but
look instead for a steady state population equilibrium. Oﬀspring inherit from
their parents the strategy that links their type with the signal to emit in each
period if they are male, and with the acceptance function, again in each period,
if they are female. The formal game-theoretic representation of a strategy in
a signalling game as a mapping from the set of possible types to the set of
admissible actions matches closely the biological definition of allele as a set of
instructions specifying the response of the individual hosting that allele to the
environment.13 In a population equilibrium, strategies, or alleles, must satisfy
two characteristics: firstly, a male’s strategy c1 (θ) must be a best response:
it must maximise a male’s season payoﬀ given the distribution of males and
13The environment includes also the individual’s characteristics: the same allele specifies
the individual’s behaviour according to the individual’s sex and characteristics.
11
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females in the population, and assuming that all other males follow c1 (θ)
and that all females behave according to α (δ) and have consistent beliefs. If
this were not the case, then some male type θ would prefer to issue a signal
other than c1 (θ), and so c1 (θ) could not be part of the equilibrium. Secondly,
among the signal functions that are best reply to themselves for given female
behaviour, I select the one which gives males the highest payoﬀ: an allele
corresponding to strategy c˜1 (θ) that did not maximise males’ payoﬀ, could
not be a population equilibrium, because a population composed of individuals
with allele c˜1 (θ) is invasible by an alternative allele giving higher payoﬀ, which
would therefore become more frequent in the population as seasons go by.
3 Equilibrium in the last two periods.
The equilibrium behaviour of both males and females in the second period is
very simple: females mate with any male they are matched with. Therefore
males do not signal: c2 (θ) = 0. In period 1, instead, females have an oppor-
tunity cost of mating and it may be beneficial for them to forgo mating with
a male they believe to be of low quality. This makes potentially preferable for
males to try to signal to females that they are of good quality, and so increase
their probability of being accepted as mate by a female.14
To lighten notation, with little loss of generality, let F1 =M1 = 1, there is
initially the same number of males and females and qF (F1,M1) = qM (F1,M1) =
1: everyone is matched in the first period. The equilibrium is found by de-
termining simultaneously the males’ optimal strategy, c1 (θ), the number of
females, F2, and males, M2, who are seeking a partner in period 2, the value,
for a matched female, of postponing mating to period 2, V F2 , and the den-
sity of the distribution of females and males in period 2. The variables other
than c1 (θ) are immediate from (5), (7), (3), (4), and (6) respectively: (10) is
obtained by substituting (12) into (3).
F2 =
Z 1
0
δΦM1 (α1 (δ))φ
F
1 (δ) dδ, (8)
14A conceptually simple, but algebraically complex induction argument extends the tech-
nique given here to the T -period case. The last period is trivial: as here, females mate with
any male and males do not signal. The behaviour in period T − 1 is found exactly like here,
taking as given the distributions of males and females determined by the past history up to
period T − 2. Backward induction takes us recursively back to period 1.
12
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M2 =
Z θmax
θmin
π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φ
M
1 (θ) dθ, (9)
V F2 =
qF (F2,M2)
M2
Z θmax
θmin
v (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φ
M
1 (θ) dθ, (10)
φF2 (δ) =
1
F2
δΦM1 (α1 (δ))φ
F
1 (δ) , (11)
φM2 (θ) =
1
M2
π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φM1 (θ) . (12)
δ, the type of the least impatient female who mates with any available male,
is given by δ = v(θmin)
V F2
. θ, the lowest male type such that every female mates
with him, is the solution in θ to v (θ) = δV F2 for δ = 1: θ = v
−1 ¡V F2 ¢.
To state the main result of this section succinctly, define the function:
a (c, w, θ) =
fθc (c, w, θ)
fc (c, w, θ)
−
µ
π00 (w)
π0 (w)
+
fwc (c, w, θ)
fc (c, w, θ)
¶
fθ (c, w, θ)
fw (c, w, θ)
.
Assumption 1 For every (c, w, θ) ∈ C ×W × [θmin, θmax], let
a (c, w, θ) +
v0 (θ)
v (θ)
> 0, (13)
and let aθ (c, w, θ) 6 0 and ac (c,w, θ) > 0.
Proposition 2 If Assumption 1 holds, then there is a population equilibrium
where males signal: a male of type θ chooses c1 (θ), which is continuous and
strictly increasing for θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¤
, and constant for θ ∈
¡
θ, θmax
¤
.
In words, males signal their type, to diﬀerentiate themselves from less at-
tractive males: males of type θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¤
separate in equilibrium and males
of type θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤
all choose the same consumption level as the highest type
male.15 The proof of this result is in Appendix A. While not readily inter-
pretable, the conditions given in Assumption 1 can well be violated, implying
that only some combinations of environmental constraints can give rise to the
15As in Grafen (1990a), there is also a non-separating equilibrium where c (θ) = 0 for every
θ ∈ [θmin, θmax]; females’ out of equilibrium beliefs can be specified consistently in many ways:
for example, suppose that females consider each male equally likely to deviate, and hence
associate to any signal c > 0 type θ with density φM1 (θ). In what follows I concentrate on
the separating equilibrium. This itself need not be unique: it may happen that females are
choosy enough to compel males to signal a lot, while in another population characterised by
identical functional forms and parameters, low discrimination by females and low signalling
by males may be the resulting equilibrium.
13
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development of conspicuous consumption as a Zahavian handicap: in diﬀer-
ent conditions, signalling may not have occurred, or it may have occurred for
traits, behavioural or physical other than the desire for conspicuous consump-
tion, just as is the case for other primate species.
We have considered a 2-period model taking the distribution of types at
the beginning of the last-but-one period as given; in a 3-period models it
would instead be endogenously determined together with the optimal strategy
of period 1. The optimal control problem corresponding to (27) for the 3-
period case would be maximised by choice of c1 (θ), c2 (θ), M2, F2, M3, F3,
V F2 , and V
F
3 , with appropriate constraints, equivalent to (23) and (24) or
derived from (3)-(7), and with the distribution of types at the beginning of
period 2 as endogenously determined. The problem would mathematically
more cumbersome, but conceptually analogous. Similarly for higher values of
T . Plausibly, the solution of the model with more than three periods would be
such that the interval of values of θ where the signal function is horizontal is
shorter in earlier periods (that is the threshold θt decreases with t): this would
follow from the fact that a female’s option value of delaying mating decreases
as times goes by, since she has fewer opportunities to meet with a high quality
male.
4 Utility maximisation.
Living species subject to evolutionary pressure reach a point on the trade-oﬀ
between individual survival and reproduction which maximises fitness subject
to their environmental constraints.16 Consider for example the males of a
species of frogs studied by Ryan et al. (1982). They emit courtship calls, which
attract both females, increasing their reproductive chances, and frog eating
bats, increasing their chances of death. Louder calls attract more females and
more bats. Females benefit by mating with bigger males, and since mating
16Fitness is a slippery concept in biology, see Dawkins (1982), pp 179—194. In the rela-
tively simple environment I consider here, with basic genetics and no “altruistic” interaction
between individuals, individual “inclusive fitness” and the population genetics concept of
frequency of the genotype in the population coincide; both correspond to Becker’s use of
the concept of “genetic fitness” (1976). In this environment, as shown by Grafen (1998),
deriving the equilibrium as the result of a postulated maximisation problem is equivalent to
deriving it from population genetics, with no assumption about maximising behaviour. The
establishment of rigorous link between these approaches is “formal Darwinism project”, a
current line of research in theoretical biology (Grafen 2006a and 2006b).
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occurs at night, size cannot be observed by female directly, and corresponds to
θ. The loudness of the courtship call of a male frog is c, and the “preference”
for loudness delicately balances the caller’s chances of attracting a female and
becoming her mate, and attracting a bat and becoming its meal: the trade-oﬀ,
however, depends on the male’s size. A biologist could therefore, in theory at
least, derive frogs’ “preference” for loudness as a function of their size from
the observation of the environment where frogs live: in terms of the model
described above, knowledge of the functions f (c,w, θ) and π (w) gives c (θ).
Biologists of course would understand clearly that male frogs’ “preference”
is in fact moulded by the action of evolutionary pressure, in the sense that
the relation between loudness and size and environment is the solution to the
problem of maximisation of inclusive fitness. With the exceptions of the works
cited in footnote 2, economists do not generally derive human preferences,
assuming them instead, without considering whether their assumptions are
consistent with an evolutionary viewpoint.
I show in this section that the standard economic problem of maximising
utility from consumption subject to a budget constraint, and the biological
problem of maximising fitness subject to environmental constraints are for-
mally equivalent. This provides an evolutionary foundation for the existence
of a utility function with trade-oﬀs between conspicuous consumption and sur-
vival activities.
I consider the two-period case examined in Section 3, using an argument
which proceeds in three steps; the extension to the T -period case is concep-
tually analogous. In the first step I construct a correspondence between the
males’ trade-oﬀ between survival and reproduction and their trade-oﬀ between
consumption goods. I then derive the males’ utility function. This is fully de-
termined by the environment, which includes the behaviour of the females of
the species. I require the utility function to satisfy two characteristics routinely
assumed in the economics literature. Firstly, that it should be independent of
θ, so that the preferences of individuals with diﬀerent θ can be represented
by the same utility function. Secondly, that its maximisation should lead to
trade-oﬀs that change continuously with the environment: the indiﬀerence
curves should be decreasing and convex. In the third and final step I establish
the correspondence between the solutions of the two problems.
Step 1. Consider an individual facing two independent lotteries. In the
first lottery, mating, with probability pm ∈ [0, 1] he mates, obtaining a prize
v (θ), and with the complement probability, 1− pm, he does not mate, which
15
Page 17 of 41
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
gives a 0 payoﬀ. The second lottery is survival, which happens with probability
ps ∈ [0, 1] and gives payoﬀ qM (F2,M2) v (θ) and again 0 in the event of death.
Total expected payoﬀ is therefore:
v (θ) (pm + qM (F2,M2) ps) . (14)
Consider next the space [θmin, θmax] ×W . A point on this space represents
the pair of the individual type θ and his acquisition of survival assets w. Let
the probability space [0, 1]2 and the space [θmin, θmax] ×W be linked by the
function G : [θmin, θmax]×W −→ [0, 1]2, which associates to a point (θ, w) the
probabilities of mating and of surviving for a male of type θ who has survival
consumption w.
G : (θ, w) 7−→
µ
ΦF1
µ
v (θ)
V F2
¶
,π (w)
¶
.
The function G depends on the population distribution in the equilibrium, via
the parameter V F2 . Notice also that G is one-to-one, and therefore invertible,
in
£
θmin, θ
¤×W .
Step 2. Consider the locus
Ik =
n
pm, ps ∈ [0, 1]2 |v (θ) (pm + qM (F2,M2) ps) = k
o
.
This is the locus of the points representing combination of probabilities which
give the same payoﬀ. These are straight lines with slope −qM (F2,M2), de-
picted on the RHS diagram in Figure 2, in the unit square [0, 1] in the (pm, ps)-
cartesian space, for various values of k.
Consider the space of consumption vectors C ×W , where a point (c, w) ∈
C×W represents a combination of conspicuous consumption (with no survival
value) and survival consumption. The function G can be used to construct
indiﬀerence curves in the consumption space (c, w) as follows. Start from a
locus Ik, and apply G−1 to each point in Ik∩G
¡£
θmin, θ
¤×W¢. This is the set
of points that gives payoﬀ k and are in the range of G, say the points on the
dotted line on the RHS of Figure 2. The image of these points under G−1 is
the locus on the north east quadrant of the LHS of the diagram: for example,
point (pam, p
a
s) is mapped into point
(θa, wa) = G−1 (pam, p
a
s) = G
−1
µ
ΦF1
µ
v (θa)
V F2
¶
,π (wa)
¶
.
16
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Figure 2: Indiﬀerence curve and constraint in the (c, w)-cartesian space.
The points on the curve G−1
¡
Ik ∩G
¡£
θmin, θ
¤×W¢¢ represent combina-
tions of type θ and survival consumption w which give the same payoﬀ. Now
simply transfer this curve to the C ×W space by writing c−11 (c) instead of θ:
w = w (c) = π−1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
k
v(c−11 (c))
− ΦF1
µ
v(c−11 (c))
V F2
¶
qM (F2,M2)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (15)
(15) is the indiﬀerence curve between c and w where the payoﬀ is k. Diagra-
matically, the equilibrium signal c1 (θ) derived in Proposition 2 takes a point
(θa, wa) in the north-east quadrant to the corresponding point in the north-
west quadrant. From θa, follow the dashed curve clockwise to the south east
quadrant, which shows the locus c1 (θ) derived in the previous section, then
to south-west quadrant, which has a 45◦ line, and determines the abscissa ca
corresponding to the ordinate θa in the north-west quadrant. Repeating the
procedure for every point in the set Ik ∩ G
¡£
θmin, θ
¤×W¢ gives the points
(ca, wa) whi h, given the strategies of all members of the population, yield a
male the same payoﬀ. The dash-dot line maps another point on the iso-payoﬀ
curve. Clearly it is not necessarily the case that these points are feasible or
optimal. A standard indiﬀerence curve, for goods which are both valuable, the
image of the set Ik ∩ G
¡£
θmin, θ
¤×W¢ must be downward sloping. This is
established in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 If Assumption 1 holds, then the image of Ik ∩ G
¡£
θmin, θ
¤×W¢
onto the (c,w)-cartesian space is a decreasing function.
17
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Proof Since Assumption 1 holds, c1 (θ) is increasing, and, therefore, it is suﬃcient
to show that the image of Ik ∩G
¡£
θmin, θ
¤×W¢ under G−1 onto the (θ, w)-cartesian
space is a decreasing function. To establish this, note that, to be on the Ik locus, a
point (θ, w) must satisfy
v (θ)
µ
ΦF1
µ
v (θ)
V F2
¶
+ qM (F2,M2)π (w)
¶
= k.
Rearrange to get
w = π−1
⎛
⎝
k
v(θ) − ΦF1
³
v(θ)
V F2
´
qM (F2,M2)
⎞
⎠ ;
diﬀerentiate with respect to θ:
dw
dθ = −
π−10(·)v0(θ)
qM (F2,M2)
⎛
⎝ k
v(θ)2
+
φF1
µ
v(θ)
V F2
¶
V F2
⎞
⎠ < 0.
Note that the indiﬀerence curves identify a preference relation on (c, w) in
the standard Arrow-Debreu sense, and the utility function is constructed by
assigning a numerical value to each indiﬀerence class, u (c,w); it is invariant
to strictly monotonic transformation, the standard ordinality requirement of a
preference representation. Another standard requirement is that the indiﬀer-
ence map should be independent of the budget constraint, or more generally
of the resource constraint. In the present set-up the latter is given by θ, and
so this requirement amount to the indiﬀerence map being the same for all
male’s types θ ∈ [θmin, θmax]. This is the case for the indiﬀerence map defined
by (15): in other words, individuals choose diﬀerent combinations of c and w
not because they have diﬀerent preferences, but because they have diﬀerent
resources, θ, at their disposal. As (15) shows, the shape of the utility function
is of course determined by the environment, represented here by the functions
π, qM , qF , and v, and the distributions ΦF1 (δ) and Φ
M
1 (θ): a change in the
environment making, say, predators more dangerous may in turn aﬀect the
matching probabilities — because individuals become less mobile —, or the fre-
quency of high θ-males — who are more likely to survive to adulthood —, and
this in turn would alter the indiﬀerence curves in (15) and the utility function
u (c,w). Notice that the environment aﬀects the function c1 (θ) itself, which in
turn enters the expression for the indiﬀerence curves in (15). This captures the
fact that, as far as each given male is concerned, the function c1 (θ) describes
the behaviour of the rest of the male population, and is therefore just as much
a characteristic of the environment as the functions π, qM , qF , v, ΦF1 and Φ
M
1 .
Step 3. The standard consumer’s problem is
max
c,w
u (c, w) , s.t.: f (c,w, θ) = 0. (16)
18
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We can transfer the points on the constraint by repeating the procedure de-
scribed in Step 2 in the opposite direction. This maps the locus f (c, w, θ) = 0
from the space C × W to the space of lotteries [0, 1]2. Take a value of
θ ∈
£
θmin, c−1 (cmax)
¤
, say θa. This determines a constraint f (c, w, θa), de-
picted in the north-west diagram as the thick black line,17 and mapped into
the north-east diagram as the set of points c−11 (c) ,ω
¡
c−11 (c) , θ
a
¢
(not shown).
Applying G to this set, and the thick curve in the RHS of the diagram is ob-
tained. This is the set of points satisfying:
(pm, ps) = G
¡
c−11 (c) ,ω
¡
c−11 (c) , θ
a
¢¢
=
µ
ΦF1
µ
v(c−11 (c))
V F2
¶
,π
¡
ω
¡
c−11 (c) , θ
a
¢¢¶
.
(17)
Consider the problem of choosing the optimal trade-oﬀ between the survival
and the reproduction lottery.
max
pm,ps
v (θ)
µ
pm +
F2
M2
ps
¶
, s.t.: (17). (18)
In order to have a well defined utility maximisation problem (and a well de-
fined fitness maximisation biology problem), the constraint must lie below the
indiﬀerence curve. On the RHS diagram, this is simply the requirement that
the image of the constraint be concave, as depicted. The relevant condition is
given in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Ifµ
fcc (·)
fc (·) −
fcw (·)
fw (·) −
π00 (·)
π0 (·)
fc (·)
fw (·)
¶
−
Ã
φF1
0
(·)
φF1 (·)
v0−1 (·) + v
00 (·)
v0 (·)
!
< 0, (19)
then there is an internal solution to problem (18), which is mapped by G−1
into the solution to problem (16).
Proof An interior solution exists if d
2ps
dp2m
< 0. (17) is a locus parameterised by c. To
derive its slope, take the derivative of both ps and pm with respect to c.
dps
dpm
=
π0
¡
ω
¡
c−11 (c) , θ
a
¢¢
ωc
¡
c−11 (c) , θ
a
¢
φF1
µ
v(c−11 (c))
V F2
¶
v0(c−11 (c))
V F2
. (20)
Invert the first component of (17) c = c1
³
v−1
³
V F2 Φ
F
1
−1
(pm)
´´
and substitute this
value into (20):
dps
dpm
= V F2
π0
³
ω
³
v−1
³
V F2 Φ
F
1
−1
(pm)
´
, θa
´´
ωc
³
v−1
³
V F2 Φ
F
1
−1
(pm)
´
, θa
´
φF1
³
ΦF1
−1
(pm)
´
v0
³
v−1
³
V F2 Φ
F
1
−1
(pm)
´´ .
17By construction, it touches the indiﬀerence curve at point (c1 (θ) , w).
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Diﬀerentiate the above with respect to pm and re-arrange to obtain:
d2ps
dp2m
=
π0 (·)ωc (·) v−10 (·)V F2 dΦ
F
1
−1
(pm)
dpm
φF1 (·) v0 (·)
nh
π00(·)
π0(·) ωc (·) + ωcc(·)ωc(·)
i
−
h
φF1
0
(·)
φF1 (·) v
0−1 (·) + v00(·)v0(·)
io
.
(21)
Lemma 3 ωc (·) = − fc(·)fw(·) < 0, ωθ (·) = −
fθ(·)
fw(·) > 0, and
ωcθ (·) = −fθc (·) fw (·)− fwc (·) fθ (·)
fw (·)2
.
Proof Start from total diﬀerentiation of f (c, w, θ) = 0, to get fc (·) dc+ fw (·) dw +
fθ (·) dθ = 0. And ωc = dwdc , and so on.
To complete the proof of the Proposition, simply apply Lemma 3 to (21) to de-
termine that d
2ps
dp2m
is negative if and only if the condition given in the statement of the
Proposition is satisfied.
As before, the point of these conditions is not so much their plausibility
or interpretability, but rather the fact that they could be violated or satis-
fied, implying that whether a given species’ biology problem is equivalent to
a standard utility maximisation problem depends in general on exogenous cir-
cumstances. If our ancestors were in a signalling equilibrium, and if (19) held
at that equilibrium, then their behaviour was equivalent to the maximisation
of the utility function which includes conspicuous consumption as an argument
attributed to Homo Economicus. Without (19), lack of convexity might have
taken the solution to a corner of the feasible set, such as points on the vertical
axis in the LHS diagram in Figure 2, where c = 0: conspicuous consumption
does not occur.
The procedure described applies apply to the region where the function
c1 (θ) is invertible; a slightly more complex argument along similar lines can
be used to show that the indiﬀerence curves in the (c, w)-cartesian space would
be horizontal for values of c higher than c1
¡
θ
¢
. But also note, as argued at
the end of Section 3, that the “flat” bit of the signal function c1 (θ) becomes
shorter as the number of periods in the season increases, and so therefore does
the range of values of c were the indiﬀerence curves are horizontal.
As a final remark, note that this set-up provides the natural conditions for
the emergence of trade: two individuals with diﬀerent θs could both move to
a higher indiﬀerence curve by exchanging some c for some w, whenever the
slope of their resource constraints are diﬀerent at their respective pre-trade
tangency point. Analysing fully this possibility would require the study of
20
Page 22 of 41
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
the way females take into account the possibility that some of the c displayed
by males be acquired through exchange, and hence adjust their inference of a
male’s types θ from his observed signal c.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper views a utility function with trade-oﬀs between consumption for its
own sake and survival activities as hard wired by evolutionary pressure exerted
by sexual selection. It therefore links Grafen’s (1990a and 1990b) analysis of
the role of sexual selection in shaping the genome with the work, by Rob-
son and others, on the evolutionary foundations of utility functions (Robson
2001a, and the references cited in footnote 2). The hard-wiring mechanism is
discussed briefly in Section 5.1, and the paper ends with some empirical evi-
dence, necessarily somewhat heuristic in nature, and with the interpretation
in the light of the ideas proposed here of some aspects of human behaviour
that economists have typically found diﬃcult to reconcile with the standard
optimising model.
5.1 Is the utility function hard-wired?
The analysis takes the utility function with conspicuous consumption as an ar-
gument as hard-wired in the human brain,18 just as, say, the capacity to learn
a language, and addresses the question: How did this utility function become
hard-wired? Fearing snakes, throwing projectiles accurately, liking sweet foods
all became hard-wired because individuals carrying the genes that determine
these behaviours were more likely to pass these genes to future generations.
The biologist’s distinction between proximate and ultimate cause is useful here:
the proximate cause of us liking sugar is the network of messages from the taste
buds to the brain stimulated by the chemical composition of some components
of sugar which creates a pleasurable reaction, well understood by biochemists.
But the ultimate cause is the fact that, over countless generations, individuals
who liked sugar had a survival advantage, well understood by biologists, over
those who did not. In this perspective we can also easily understand why we
love our own children, even in the absence of any personal survival advantage
18This is also the view held by Postlewaite (1998) in a paper that hints at some of the ideas
presented here, see pp 781—782. He considers social status as “instrumental in determining
ultimate consumption levels” (p 785, the marriage model in Cole et al. 1992 is built on this
view).
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of this trait: genes that make individuals love, nurture and protect their own
children are more likely to populate future generations. But why consumption
for its own sake? Where was the evolutionary benefit of coveting goods? The
proximate cause of our desire to consume is of course the pleasurable sensa-
tion deriving from the possession and display of beautiful, comfortable, rare,
precious and luxurious goods, eloquently described by Ian McEwan (2005, p
75—76), and powerfully exploited by Western explorers conquering aboriginals
with the oﬀer of glass beads and other conspicuous items. I argue here that
the ultimate cause is sexual selection: individuals who had a stronger desire
for consumption for its own sake were more likely to be chosen as mates by
members of the opposite sex and hence more likely to pass on to future gen-
erations the genes inducing them to desire goods. I stress the unconscious
nature of the link: among social animals, “the motivation of a male chim-
panzee who challenges another’s rank is not that he foresees more matings or
better food or a longer life”, but a hard-wired and hence simpler and deeper
urge to dominate his peers (Wrangham and Peterson 1996, p 199). Similarly
for humans, the desire for conspicuous consumption, the love for our children,
the pleasure from sugar are all designed by evolution to be ends in themselves,
to operate independently of whether there is an immediate survival or repro-
ductive reward: the starving and the obese both enjoy food, adoptive parents
love their children as much as biological parents, and humans, young, old, and
homosexual, all desire consumption for its own sake.
5.2 Resources and signalling.
The Murdock and White (1969) dataset contains information on around 200
“pre-industrial” human societies, where conditions and behaviours are more
likely to resemble those prevailing at the time our psychological traits took
shape. The necessarily approximate nature of this dataset, and the relative
lack of economic variables restrict its use in economics, and while certainly
unsuitable for a rigorous test of the conditions in Assumption 1, which depend
on the shape of the constraint f (c,w, θ), the survival function π (w), and the
benefit function v (θ) in a non-linear way, it allows nevertheless a simple test
of the link between resources, θ, and signalling, c. In my model, if resources
are barely suﬃcient for survival, then signalling is prohibitively expensive, and
hence unlikely to emerge as a viable equilibrium strategy. I account for the
interaction between female choice and the benefit of signalling via a stylised
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model where the exogenously given society resources aﬀect the degree of polyg-
yny (more resources allow a more unequal distribution of resources and hence
of females), and where signalling is beneficial to the extent that females exert
choice. Polygyny, ceteris paribus, increases the benefit of signalling. To esti-
mate this,19 I construct indices of how polygynous a society is (the variable
“polygyny” in the equations below), and of how close it is to subsistence (the
variable “resources”, containing, among others, the development and the re-
liance on agriculture, the quality of the environment, including diseases, the
extent of female contribution to subsistence, the frequency of famines and star-
vation). Signalling (“signal”) is measured by the presence of activities, such
as mining, woodcarving, hunting large game, musical instruments and so on,
which are not necessary for survival, and whether these activities are carried
out by men or by women; “female choice” measures how necessary a woman’s
agreement is for her to be married or re-married. A two stage least square
estimation of simultaneous equations, to account for the endogeneity of polyg-
yny, gives the following results (161 observations are used, t-statistics are in
brackets, and the Pseudo R2 are 0.09 and 0.20):
polygyny = .337
(2.64)
+ .338
(3.84)
resources − .101
(2.56)
pop. density
signal = 1.59
(5.63)
+ .205
(1.82)
polygyny + .136
(2.63)
female choice − .265
(4.69)
log(population)
The coeﬃcients in these equations have the predicted signs: more resources
entail more polygyny, and more female choice increases the likelihood that
signalling is taking place in the society. Coeﬃcients are significant at the 5%
level with the exception of the polygyny index in the second equation, which is
significant at 10%. Population size and density also influence the endogenous
variables; the use of diﬀerent control variables does not alter the qualitative
nature of the estimation, indicating, within the limits of the dataset, a certain
robustness of the results, even though other interpretations are clearly feasible.
5.3 Conspicuous consumption in the Pleistocene.
Kohn and Mithen’s (1999) theory that handaxes were the product of sexual
selection also suggests support for my paper. Handaxes are very intriguing ar-
chaeological finds: manufactured for over one million years, they are frequently
19Details are available on request or at www.le.ac.uk/economics/gdf4/curres.htm.
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found unused in very large hoards in individual sites, perfected well beyond
the necessity of use, their very symmetry and size making many of them inap-
propriate for any practical purpose such as throwing or butchering. All these
features induce Kohn and Mithen to reject the “survival” justification of such
a persistent oddity, and to opt instead for a sexual selection explanation: the
ability to knap and handle symmetric and polished handaxes was used as re-
liable indicator of a potential mate’s quality by those of the opposite sex, and
thus conferred a reproductive advantage which outweighed the survival costs
involved in their production, the time diverted from feeding or hunting while
looking for materials and knapping, the risk of injury to hands and eyes, and
so on.20
Viewing sexual selection as a powerful engine for evolution can help biolo-
gists explain the development of certain traits which would provide little or no
survival value unless fully developed. A classic example is the evolution from
reptiles’ scales to birds’ feathers: light and flimsy scales have lower survival
value than either solid scales or fully formed feathers, so it is diﬃcult to explain
what drove evolution from the former to the latter, given that evolution does
not plan for the long term. According to some avian biologists (eg Cowen and
Lipps 2000), sexual selection can indicate a possible route. If the flimsiness
and lightness of an individual’s scales serve as a costly signal (since flimsy and
light scales are less useful as a defence mechanism) reptiles with flimsier and
lighter scales, would visibly signal their unobservable characteristics. Eventu-
ally this sexually selected trait also proved to have survival advantages, and
become further established and developed.21 If we translate this argument
to humans, we can address one of the Darwin’s puzzles of human evolution,
the development of mental abilities with little or no survival value at the time
they evolved. In the spirit of Miller (2000), my paper can be interpreted to
20 It is also worth noting that the unobserved characteristic of interest to females which is
signalled is single dimensional, the contribution to fitness of oﬀspring. Therefore, a single
dimensional signal is suﬃcient, and this might also explain the exclusive reliance on handaxes,
which appear to have been the only item which was manufactured on the planet for a very
long period of time: the explosion in tools use and variety occurred around 50,000 years ago.
21“If, however, some scales evolved gradually to become signals to advertise certain traits,
such as elegance of movement or certain jumps, then the scales may increase in size by the
process of signal selection, handicapping their bearer’s gait or jump, attesting to the reliability
of the signal. Such scales can attain extravagant dimensions. The extravagant scales may
then turn out to be of help in gliding. Once gliding becomes an important adaptation, the
extravagant scales can evolve into utilitarian feathers by utilitarian selection” (Zahavi 2007).
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suggest that dexterity, manufacturing, understanding of the relative merits of
diﬀerent materials, knowledge of the sources of such materials, mining, and so
on, all developed as a means of impressing the members of the opposite sex
and influencing their mating choices, and were continually improved by sexual
selection, until the time where the level of development reached by these traits
would also have a survival value, in manufacturing sharper spears, in selecting
and mining suitable materials and so on.22
The arbitrariness of sexually selected traits may also prompt the question
of possible alternative routes that human evolution might have taken. One
conceivable example is information gathering and processing: what if, at the
dawn of the human race, our ancestors had considered the most desirable
mates those with the best ability to recognise remember and classify features
of the environment such as leaves in trees, animal footprints, birds flights,
star configurations, weather patterns, rather than those with the most con-
spicuous consumption? Clearly a signal of this nature would soon acquire a
large potential survival value, and might lead to many imaginable diﬀerent
human evolutionary paths beginning there. The exploration of this possibility
is however best left to science fiction writers.
5.4 Sex diﬀerences and female signalling
In the paper only females choose an only males signal. This is a logical con-
sequence of the unrealistic assumption that the opportunity cost of mating
is zero for male and strictly positive for females. This makes the algebraic
treatment convenient and is realistic for some species. However, it clearly is
the case that human males do make parental investment and therefore incur
a cost in terms of foregone mating opportunities. This implies that males too
would prefer not to mate if they believe that a female they have met is of
suﬃciently low quality; for example, the benefit of mating to a male could
depend on the value of δ of the female he is matched with, given that her
survival is likely to be helpful to the weaning of the oﬀspring. The probability
of a male agreeing to mate with a first period match would be strictly less
than one, and in particular would depend on his beliefs regarding his poten-
tial mate’s δ. If δ is not perfectly observable, then an equilibrium may exist
where females signal their own fertility through a costly signal, conspicuous
22Other traits, such as the aesthetic sense or the ability to judge the symmetry of a man-
ufact also developed, but did not have a survival value. Miller (2000) extends this argument
to include the development of many specifically human activities such as art, music, conver-
sation, humour and so on.
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consumption, or a diﬀerent trait such as hair length or breast size (Zahavi
and Zahavi 1997). Ironing out the details of the equilibrium would require
modifying appropriately the probabilities of being in the market in the second
period, which for males would now also depend on their acceptance strategy,
endogenising appropriately the females’ survival probability, determining the
additional variables VM2 (θ) (a male’s value of going to the next period) and
cF1 (δ) (females’ optimal signalling), and deriving the incentive compatibility
constraint for females.
Even with the adaptation of the model along the above lines, given the
asymmetry in reproductive opportunities of males and females, and the na-
ture of the qualities that are valued by members of the other sex, it would still
be the case that individuals of diﬀerent sexes signal their qualities in diﬀerent
ways, in line with the evolutionary biologists’ view that sexually selected traits
diﬀer in the two sexes. The idea proposed in this paper receives therefore an
indirect confirmation from the diﬀerences observed in the general attitude of
men and women towards consumption. Few nowadays question the evolution-
ary psychologists’ view that there are profound diﬀerences between the sexes
(eg Buss 1994 and 2004): not only in the attitudes towards casual and extra-
marital sex, which has a direct explanation in terms of diﬀerential parental
investment and justifies the assumption in the model that men and women
have diﬀerent attitudes towards multiple mating in the season, but also in the
attitudes towards wealth and resources. Examples range from warfare, which
is typically waged by men and is almost universally caused by the quest for
more territory and resources,23 to the observations that men value earnings
and possessions more than women do, that they are more systematic collec-
tors than women, and that men with more resources have more sexual partners
(Kanazawa 2003), and more attractive partners, to Buss’s team’s results, who
systematically analysed lonely hearts columns and conducted surveys in 37 dif-
ferent societies, amply demonstrating how women prefer wealth in men, when
men prefer youth in women (Buss et al. 1990). The combined force of these
and many other examples overwhelmingly supports the claim that “men seek
wealth because they know it attracts women” (Ridley 2003, p 54). In order to
perform this function, wealth must of course be displayed: in our forebears’
environment, conspicuous consumption was one of the few eﬀective ways to
display one’s wealth.
23Both in human and in chimpanzees, the only other species in which it is known that
bands of males set out to attack other males from a diﬀerent group (Buss 2004, pp 280ﬀ).
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5.5 Altruism
Most people leave tips in restaurants which they will never visit again. By the
same token, overwhelming experimental evidence indicates that subjects play-
ing ultimatum or dictator games do not take advantage of other players who
are complete strangers and will remain so at the conclusion of the experiment.
Many of the explanations for this prima facie irrational behaviour are based on
some form of maladaption (see Samuelson 2005, pp 96—100). Seabright (2004,
pp 61—62) suggests that a tendency not to take advantage of short term op-
portunities evolved at a time when essentially all interactions happened within
a group. There has therefore been no opportunity for a Darwinian evolution
of the ability to distinguish between members of the group, co-operation to-
wards whom does have a long term evolutionary advantage, and strangers, who
will not be met again, and there is no such advantage. Similarly, we should
not “be surprised if the physiological and psychological mechanisms that have
evolved to sustain equilibria in repeated games should somehow be triggered
inappropriately in one-shot situations”, such as anonymous experimental ul-
timatum games (Binmore 1994, p 183). Frank ’s view (1987), on the other
hand, is not based on maladaption: altruistic individuals enjoyed an evolu-
tionary advantage, as they could be trusted in cooperative ventures, which
exceeded the short term cost of altruistic acts. According to Frank, emotions
have evolved both as a signal and as a commitment device: feeling guilty if
we cheat someone, be they strangers or friends, reduces the utility of selfishly
taking advantage of short term opportunities.
In addition to the survival advantages which “genes for altruism” may con-
fer to their human bearers, this paper suggests that there may also have been
strong reproductive benefits accruing to individuals who behaved altruistically:
consumption is meant to be displayed to convert it into mating opportunities,
and, in an environment where long-lasting physical commodities are rare, “acts
of altruism” may serve as a substitute for durable stores of value. By increas-
ing c, an act of altruism serves as a signal that one is accumulating enough
resources that the cost of “wasting” some on strangers is negligible. A recent
example is the potlatch, a ceremonial feast in some Native American popula-
tion in which chiefs ostentatiously destroy wealth (similar events occur in New
Guinea, and among the Maori, the Koha, the Kula, the Moka): “the potlatch
consists of goods that are perishable or vulnerable; the prestige that it buys is
a good that is durable and portable” (Ridley 1986, p 122).
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This viewpoint may shed light on some altruistic acts which are incon-
sistent with the maladaption explanation: for example, in restaurants, men
tip better than women, and men accompanied by women tip better than men
alone and than men accompanied by other men (Miller 2000, p 326); similarly,
men are more likely to give to street beggars if they are walking with a woman
(Stark 1992). The interpretation that men try to impress women with their
altruism runs into the obvious diﬃculty that from a woman’s survival per-
spective what matters is her partner’s altruism towards her ; acts of altruism
towards strangers are in fact bad news, because they indicate a propensity to
profligacy which would divert resources away from her and their oﬀspring. If,
however, as contended here, altruism is a form of consumption, then it acts as
a costly signal of a man’s unobservable qualities, and it make perfect sense that
it should be practised more when it is more likely to be observed by females.
This argument, incidentally, is in line with the conclusion that Zahavi
and his associates have drawn following their decades long observation of the
Arabian babblers (Turdiodes squamiceps), small birds living in groups in the
Israeli deserts. These birds are altruistic: they share “chick care”, they put
their lives at greater risk by acting as sentinels for the group and mobbing
predators, they share food with non-relatives. A repeated game justification
based on Trivers’ (1985) concept of reciprocal altruism would predict that
these birds would try to cheat when they can get away undetected, reaping
benefits without paying the costs. In fact, they do nothing of the sort: they
compete to perform the apparently altruistic acts: dominant birds, upon seeing
a subordinate trying to act as sentinel, will attack and drive oﬀ the subordinate,
taking over the sentinel role; they also try forcibly to stuﬀ food down the
throats of reluctant non-relatives. Zahavi and Zahavi believe that the Arabian
babblers are using these ‘altruistic’ acts as handicaps to display their fitness,
thereby attaining better reproductive prospects within the group. “The helper
benefits from the act of helping, and the benefits to others are incidental”
(Zahavi and Zahavi 1997, p 134, my emphasis).
5.6 The endowment eﬀect
Consider, to end, the “endowment eﬀect” (Thaler 1980): people require more
to be separated from an object they own than they are willing to pay for the
same object when they do not own it. The experimental evidence, which is
inconsistent with traditional explanations based on transaction costs or income
eﬀects, has been interpreted in support of the theory of reference dependent
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utility (Kahneman et al. 1990). A diﬀerent, not necessarily alternative, expla-
nation is suggested by the analysis of this paper. To the extent that possession
of physical goods is a signal, utility should be increased by the possession of
visible goods more than by the right to receive the same goods, because, while
today this right is represented by money, with a high certainty of conversion,
in the Pleistocene, when our utility function took shape, the conversion of
promises into goods was likely to be less than certain. Having a claim to a
good was not the same as possessing the good itself. In a variant of the exper-
iment which seems designed to test this idea, instead of exchanging money for
goods, experimental subjects traded money for tokens that represented a claim
to those same goods. In this case, there was no observed endowment eﬀect:
subjects had the same trade-oﬀ to receive and to give up tokens. This clearly
tallies with the ideas of this paper, once it is noted that tokens and money
have the same signal value, which is lower than the signal value displayed by
physical possession of the goods.
Appendix A: Existence of a separating equilibrium.
In this technical section I prove Proposition 2. I do so by looking for a signal
as a function of type c1 (θ) which is a best reply to itself and which is such
that there is no alternative strategy (allele) that gives a higher payoﬀ, and that
can therefore invade a population made entirely of individuals following c1 (θ).
In addition, females themselves optimise and make correct inferences about
males’ types from the signals they issue. Mathematically, this corresponds to
a mechanism design problem, and the revelation principle ensures the solution
can be found by maximisation of the payoﬀ function subject to the incentive
compatibility constraint, which imposes the same constraint as the requirement
that a strategy be a best response to itself.
Suppose to begin that all males follow strategy c1 (θ). Given the females’
optimal strategy, and given that females correctly infer a male’s type from the
observation of the signal c1 (θ), consider the options open to a male matched
with a female. If he has type θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¤
, he mates if and only if the female
has type δ = α−1 (θ) or less (see Figure 1), and so he mates with probability
ΦF1
¡
α−1 (θ)
¢
. From (2), α−1 (θ) = v(θ)
V F2
. If he has type θ or above, he will mate
with probability 1. This gives the probability of mating for a male of type θ
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matched to a female as:(
ΦF1
³
v(θ)
V F2
´
for θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¢
1 for θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤ .
The (season) payoﬀ to a male of type θ is therefore:
U (θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
v (θ)ΦF1
³
v(θ)
V F2
´
+ qM (F2,M2) v (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ)) for θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¢
v (θ) + qM (F2,M2) v (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ)) for θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤ .
(22)
I next determine the condition that ensures the optimality of the signal emitted
by a male, that is, for every type θ ∈ [θmin, θmax], the signal that maximise the
season expected payoﬀ of a male with type θ. This is done by showing that
there cannot be profitable deviations from a candidate strategy. To do so, since
issuing a signal outside the image of [θmin, θmax] under c1 is a strategy open to
males, requires that females’ belief be definied for these signals. One system
of beliefs that satisfies the consistency requirement of sequential equilibrium
(Kreps and Wilson 1982) is the following. Let C1 ⊆ R+ be the image of
[θmin, θmax] under c1. I define a female’s beliefs if she observes a signal cˆ which
does not belong to C1 as follows: if cˆ < minC1, then cb1
−1
(cˆ) = θmin with
probability 1, if cˆ > maxC1, then cb1
−1
(cˆ) = θmax with probability 1. If C1 is
not an interval, then cb1
−1
(cˆ) = inf {θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] |c1 (θ) > cˆ}. In words, if
a female see a signal lower (higher) than the lowest (highest) expected signal,
then she assume that the issuer of that signal is the lowest (highest) type. If
she sees a signal in a “hole” in the image of [θmin, θmax] (for this to happen,
c1 (θ) must be discontinuous) she infers that issuer of that signal is the lowest
possible type above the “hole”.
Lemma 4 Let c1 (θ) be a male’s optimal signal. c1 (θ) is continuous and it
satisfies c1 (θmin) = 0:
U˙ (θ) = v0 (θ)ΦF1
µ
v (θ)
V F2
¶
(23)
+ qM (F2,M2)
£
v (θ)π0 (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))ωθ (c1 (θ) , θ) + v0 (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))
¤
,
and
dc1 (θ)
dθ
> 0, (24)
for θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¤
. For θ ∈
¡
θ, θmax
¤
, c1 (θ) is constant and equal to c1
¡
θ
¢
.
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Proof Begin by noting that the optimal signal c1 (θ) must be increasing: θa > θb
implies c1 (θa) > c1 (θb). If c1 (θa) < c1 (θb) then a male of type θb would improve
his payoﬀ by choosing signal c1 (θa): he would incur a lower cost and receive a higher
benefit.
Clearly, since c1 (θmin) = 0 there cannot be a signal “below” the image. A devi-
ation “above” the image, say c0 > max {c1 ([θmin, θmax])} cannot be profitable, since
a male would incur lower cost at no loss of benefit by choosing c1 (θmax) instead of
c0. Next we show that the image of [θmin, θmax] is an interval, and so c1 is con-
tinuous. By contradiction, let c1 be discontinuous at a point θ0 ∈ (θmin, θmax):
limθ→θ−0
c1 (θ) < limθ→θ+0 c1 (θ). Then there exists ε > 0 such that a male of type
θ0 + ε would benefit by choosing signal c1 (θ0 − ε): since φF1 (δ) and the acceptance
function α (δ) are continuous, he would have an infinitesimal reduction in benefit and
a discrete reduction in cost.
Therefore, if there is a profitable deviation, it must be to a point in the image of
[θmin, θmax]. Suppose a male has true type θ but behaves as if he had type θˆ: to do
so, he needs to emit signal c1(θˆ): this will induce a female to mate with him with
probability ΦF1
³
v(θˆ)
V F2
´
if θˆ < θ, and probability 1 if θˆ > θ; but it will also change his
probability of survival to π(ω(c1(θˆ), θ)). His (season) payoﬀ for choosing signal c1(θˆ)
would therefore be:
ϕ(θ, θˆ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
v (θ)
h
ΦF1
³
v(θˆ)
V F2
´
+ qM (F2,M2)π(ω(c1(θˆ), θ))
i
for θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¢
v (θ)
h
1 + qM (F2,M2)π(ω(c1(θˆ), θ))
i
for θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤ .
A male will choose the “best” possible value of θˆ: the value of θˆ such that ∂ϕ(θ,θˆ)
∂θˆ
= 0:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
v(θ)
V F2
φF1
³
v(θˆ)
V F2
´
v0(θˆ) + qM (·) v (θ)π0(ω(c1(θˆ), θ))ωc(c1(θˆ), θ)c01(θˆ) = 0 for θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¢
qM (·) v (θ)π0(ω(c1(θˆ), θ), θ)ωc(c1(θˆ), θ)c01(θˆ) = 0 for θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤ .
(25)
By the second line, c1 (θ) is constant for θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤
, yielding utility:
U (θ) = v (θ)
£
1 + qM (F2,M2)π
¡
ω
¡
c
¡
θ
¢
, θ
¢¢¤
for θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤
.
By continuity of c1 (θ), the value of the constant value of the signal is c1
¡
θ
¢
. Consider
now θ ∈
£
θmin, θ
¢
. Diﬀerentiate (22) with respect to θ:
U˙ (θ) = v (θ)
∙
v0 (θ)
V F2
φF1
µ
v (θ)
V F2
¶
+ qM (·)π0 (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))ωc (c1 (θ) , θ) c01 (θ)
¸
+ v0 (θ)
∙
ΦF1
µ
v (θ)
V F2
¶
+ qM (·)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))
¸
+ v (θ) qM (·)π0 (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))ωθ (c1 (θ) , θ) .
Incentive compatibility implies ∂ϕ(θ,θˆ)
∂θˆ
¯¯¯
θ=θˆ
= 0, and so, by (25), the first term in
the above vanishes, thus establishing (23). Consider (24): c1 (θ) must be strictly
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monotonic, in order for the females to be able to “invert” it and infer θ from c, and
I showed early that it is increasing. Finally, for θ ∈
£
θ, θmax
¤
, the last part of the
statement, notice that there is no point in increasing the signal beyond the level that
induces every female to mate, and males of higher type than θ will therefore not
separate.
We can now solve the problem with optimal control techniques, (Leonard
and van Long 1992, LvL hereafter).24 The state variable is U (θ), and c1 (θ) is
the control variable. U
¡
θ
¢
is free, and the lower boundary condition is given
by the requirement that the lowest type issues a 0 signal, obtaining payoﬀ:
U (θmin) = v (θmin)ΦF1
µ
v (θmin)
V F2
¶
+ qM (F2,M2) v (θmin)π (ω (0, θmin)) . (26)
The problem can therefore be stated formally as an optimal control prob-
lem, with a free terminal “time” θ, a scrap value function, — the second integral
in the maximand (27) — (LvL pp 244ﬀ), and control parameters M2, F2, V F2
(LvL pp 253ﬀ):
max
c1(θ),M2,
F2,V F2
Z θ
θmin
U (θ)φM1 (θ) dθ +
Z θmax
θ
v (θ)
£
1 + qM (F2,M2)π
¡
ω
¡
c
¡
θ
¢
, θ
¢¢¤
φM1 (θ) dθ,
(27)
s.t: (9), (8), (10), (23) and (24).
Proof of Proposition 2. To apply optimal control solution methods, the integral
constraints (9) and (10) need to be replaced by auxiliary constraints and state variables
(LvL p 191). Write (10) as:Z θ
θmin
v (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φM1 (θ) dθ =
M2V
F
2
qM (F2,M2)
−
Z θmax
θ
v (θ)π
¡
ω
¡
c
¡
θ
¢
, θ
¢¢
φM1 (θ) dθ,
and replace it with:
k˙ (θ) = v (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φM1 (θ) , (28)
k (θmin) = 0, k
¡
θ
¢
=
M2V
F
2
qM (F2,M2)
−
Z θmax
θ
v (θ)π
¡
ω
¡
c
¡
θ
¢
, θ
¢¢
φM1 (θ) dθ.
24Grafen (1990a) determines the equilibrium using functional analysis, and Bergstrom et
al. (2002) propose an approach based on vector field analysis. As far as I am aware, there
are no approaches using optimal control.
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Similarly for (9), which is replaced by:
h˙ (θ) = π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φ
M
1 (θ) , (29)
h (θmin) = 0, h
¡
θ
¢
=M2 −
Z θmax
θ
π
¡
ω
¡
c
¡
θ
¢
, θ
¢¢
φM1 (θ) dθ.
The Lagrangean associated to problem (27) can now be written as:
L = U (θ)φM1 (θ) dθ+ (30)
+ µ (θ)
n
v0 (θ)ΦF1
³
v(θ)
V F2
´
+ qM (F2,M2)
£
v (θ)π0 (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))ωθ (c1 (θ) , θ)
+ v0 (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))
¤o
+ ξ (θ) v (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φ
M
1 (θ)
+ ζ (θ)π (ω (c1 (θ) , θ))φ
M
1 (θ) + λ
∙
F2 −
Z 1
0
δΦM1
¡
max
©
v−1
¡
δV F2
¢
, θmin
ª¢
φF1 (δ) dδ
¸
,
where ξ (θ) and ζ (θ) are the Pontryagin multipliers associated to constraint (23), (28)
and (29), and λ the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint (8) (LvL p 255). To
determine the costate variable µ (θ), diﬀerentiate L with respect to U (θ).
− ∂L
∂U (θ)
= µ˙ (θ) = −φM1 (θ) .
Solving the above with the boundary conditions µ
¡
θ
¢
= 0 (because U
¡
θ
¢
is free), and
µ (θmin) free (LvL Theorem 7.1.1, p 222), gives:
µ (θ) = ΦM1
¡
θ
¢
− ΦM1 (θ) .
The first order conditions for the transformed integral constraints are − ∂L∂k(θ) = ξ˙ (θ) =
0 and− ∂L∂h(θ) = ζ˙ (θ) = 0, implying that ξ and ζ are constant. Notice also that they are
both positive: they increase the value of the Lagrangean (30), and can be interpreted
as the shadow prices (LvL p 152ﬀ) ofM2 and V F2 , an increase in both of which increase
males’ payoﬀ. Now, c1 (θ), which must satisfy the condition ∂L∂c1(θ) = 0. Expanding it
and re-arranging gives:
v (θ) [π00 (·)ωθ (·)ωc (·) + π0 (·)ωθc (·)]+π0 (·)ωc (·)
µ
v0 (θ) + φ
M
1 (θ)(ξv(θ)+ζ)
[ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)]qM (F2,M2)
¶
= 0,
π00 (·)
π0 (·) ωθ (·) +
ωθc (·)
ωc (·) +
v0 (θ)
v (θ)
+
φM1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)
qM (F2,M2)
µ
ξ +
ζ
v (θ)
¶
= 0. (31)
Now use Lemma 3 to replace the terms in ω (·), and write (31) as:
a (c1 (θ) , w, θ) +
⎛
⎜⎝v
0 (θ)
v (θ)
+
φM1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ1)−ΦM1 (θ)
qM (F2,M2)
µ
ξ +
ζ
v (θ)
¶⎞
⎟⎠ = 0. (32)
Now notice that, since ac (·) > 0, c1 (θ) can be obtained from (32) as a function
where F2, M2, V F2 , and θ, and the multipliers ξ and ζ are parameters. This can be
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substituted for c1 (θ) in the appropriate constraints and first order conditions, and
solved. This is conceptually simple, but algebraically complex, and I do not do it
here. In order for the expression c1 (θ) derived from (32) to be a feasible solution, it is
also necessary that it is strictly increasing in
£
θmin, θ
¤
(see (24)). The derivative with
respect to θ of the term in the large brackets in (32) is:
v00 (θ)
v (θ)
−
µ
v0 (θ)
v (θ)
¶2
+
d
dθ
µ
φM1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)
¶³
ξ + ζv(θ)
´
− φ
M
1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)
ζv0(θ)
v(θ)2
qM (F2,M2)
. (33)
Rewrite (32) as
ξ +
ζ
v (θ)
= −
qM (F2,M2)
³
a (c,w, θ) + v
0(θ)
v(θ)
´
φM1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)
,
and so (33) can be written as :
A =
v00 (θ)
v (θ)
−
µ
v0 (θ)
v (θ)
¶2
−
d
dθ
µ
φM1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)
¶
φM1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)
∙
a (c, w, θ) +
v0 (θ)
v (θ)
¸
(34)
−
φM1 (θ)
ΦM1 (θ)−ΦM1 (θ)
qM (F2,M2)
ζv0 (θ)
v (θ)2
.
If (13) holds, then the term in the square bracket is positive and so the third term is
negative. The other terms are all negative: recall that
d
dθ
Ã
ΦM1
¡
θ
¢
− ΦM1 (θ)
φM1 (θ)
!
< 0, for every θ ∈ (θmin, θmax)
and so the derivative of the reciprocal is positive, v0 (θ) > 0, v00 (θ) < 0, and ζ, ξ > 0.
Therefore A is itself negative. Next totally diﬀerentiate (32) with respect to θ and c:
ac (c, w, θ) dc+ [aθ (c, w, θ) +A] dθ = 0,
and so
dc1
dθ
=
−aθ (c, w, θ)−A
ac (c, w, θ)
.
By the assumptions in the statement, A is negative, see (34), aθ (c,w, θ) < 0 and
ac (c, w, θ) > 0, and therefore dc1dθ > 0, which ends the proof.
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